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Closing the Wage Gap: Cities’ and States’ Prohibitions Against Prior Salary History 
Inquiries and the Implications Moving Forward 
Timothy J. Nichols* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In an effort to eliminate wage discrimination on account of sex, Congress enacted the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).1  The EPA amended section 6 of the Fair Labor and Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA), adding a new subsection.2  While this new subsection prohibits employers from paying 
workers of one sex different wages than workers of the other sex different wages for equal work, 
the subsection also includes four enumerated exceptions.3  Despite efforts to eliminate wage 
discrimination based on gender, women earned eighty-three percent of what men earned in 2015 
(granted, an increase from sixty-four percent in 1980).4  While this pay gap is based on many 
factors, such as (1) women being more likely to take breaks from careers to care for a family, and 
(2) women being overrepresented in lower-paying occupations, surveys reveal this gap may also 
be a result of gender discrimination.5   
The broadest and most controversial of the exceptions contained in the FLSA is a catch-all 
that permits disparities in pay between the genders “based on any other factor other than sex.”6  
Prior salary history, the focus of this Comment, is a regularly relied-upon factor employers assert 
as a “factor other than sex” when facing claims of gender-based wage discrimination under the 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; Dual B.A., University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 
1 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56. 
2 Id. The Act created 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963) that prohibits gender discrimination in wage payment practices. Id. at 
56–57. 
3 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963). 
4 Anna Brown and Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, Gender Gap in Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/03/gender-pay-gap-facts/. 
5 Id. Women were twice as likely as men to feel discriminated at work because of gender (18% vs. 10%); also, 77% 
of women and 63% of men believe more changes must be implemented to achieve gender equality in the workplace. 
Id. 
6 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963). 
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EPA and FLSA, as seen in the cases discussed below.7  Further adding to the controversy is the 
fact that the different circuit courts that have addressed the relationship between prior salary history 
and the “factor other than sex” exception have applied different standards in evaluating the claims.8  
Two circuit courts have held that prior salary history cannot be the sole factor in justifying pay 
disparities between the genders.9  Two other circuit courts allow reliance on prior salary history as 
the sole justification, but conduct an inquiry into the reasonableness and asserted reasons for the 
reliance.10  One final circuit court accepts prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” 
unequivocally.11 
In an effort to continue closing the gender wage gap, multiple cities and states around the 
country have enacted legislation that prohibits employers from inquiring about applicants’ prior 
salary histories or requiring applicants to disclose such information.12  All of these laws have a 
general prohibition on employers seeking an applicant’s prior salary history but have certain 
unique provisions and range from more restrictive to less restrictive depending on the particular 
law.13  And although the push to institute these types of laws has intensified, these laws have been 
met with resistance.14 
This Comment argues that state and town legislatures, displeased with the on-going wage 
discrepancy between the genders and the analysis and outcomes of the judiciary in cases alleging 
                                                     
7 See supra Part II(B)–(D). 
8 See id. 
9 See Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 70 Fed. Appx. 500 (10th Cir. 2003); Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 
1995). 
10 See Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, reh’g granted, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.) (en 
banc); Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003). 
11 See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005). 
12 Dori Goldstein, More Laws Enacted to Ban Salary History Inquiries, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jun. 5, 2017), 
https://www.bna.com/delaware-oregon-enact-b73014453430/; F. Christopher Chrisbens, San Francisco Joins the 
Salary History Inquiry “Ban” Wagon, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/san-
francisco-joins-salary-history-inquiry-ban-wagon.  
13 See infra Part III. 
14 See infra Part IV. 
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gender discrimination under the EPA, are enacting these new laws to remove the most 
controversial element of courts’ analysis.  Part II of this Comment provides an in-depth discussion 
of the EPA and the FLSA, along with the conflicting stances federal circuit courts have adopted 
regarding the interplay between prior salary history and one of the exceptions of the FLSA.  Part 
III discusses the laws currently enacted by cities and states all across the United States as of this 
writing and compares and contrasts elements of the laws with each other.  Part IV introduces some 
of the emerging backlash against the laws and the implications the laws have across the country 
now and moving forward.  Part V argues that the cities and states enacting the laws are effectively 
circumventing one of the exceptions under the FLSA by removing prior salary in its entirety from 
the consideration, eliminating the catch-all from the courts’ analysis.  Part VI suggests that, until 
prior salary history inquiry bans become universally enacted, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits’ 
approach is the correct approach to analyzing prior salary history as a “factor other than sex.” Part 
VII briefly concludes. 
II. The Equal Pay Act, “Factors Other Than Sex,” and the Current Circuit Split 
A. The Equal Pay Act 
As mentioned above, the EPA “prohibit[s] discrimination on account of sex in the payment 
of wages by employers engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.”15  The 
new subsection to FLSA added by the EPA states: 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section 
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are 
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to 
employees in such an establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he 
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal 
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.16 
 
                                                     
15 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 56. 
16 Id. at 56–57; 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963). 
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The above text comes with a caveat, however, that a wage disparity ordinarily impermissible under 
the statute is otherwise permissible: “where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority 
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”17  The “factor other 
than sex” exception is the broadest-worded exception among the enumerated exceptions and the 
statute does not state a scope or any standard for determining which factors qualify as a “factor 
other than sex.”18  Some have argued prior salary history should be considered a “suspect factor”—
a factor that, if courts allow employers to rely on it to permanently justify salary disparities, could 
perpetuate gender-based violations of the EPA.19 
 Courts have also indicated caution when dealing with prior salary history as a “factor other 
than sex.”20  The Ninth Circuit noted that prior salary history could be manipulated to provide a 
pretext for intentional gender discrimination, and an employer could take advantage of “unfairly 
low salaries historically paid to women” in order to perpetuate that discrimination.21  The Seventh 
Circuit recognized the concern that previous employers might have engaged in sex-based 
discrimination in wage practices, thereby resulting in lower wages for female employees when 
current employers rely on that tainted prior salary history.22  Despite this caution, courts accept 
that prior salary history may justify current pay disparities, but the courts are split on whether prior 
salary history satisfies the “factor other than sex” exception under the EPA.23 
B. The Circuit Split: Prior Salary History and an Additional Factor 
                                                     
17 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 57 (emphasis added). 
18 Jeanne M. Hamburg, Note: When Prior Pay Isn’t Equal Pay: A Proposed Standard for the Identification of “Factors 
Other Than Sex” Under the Equal Pay Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1989). 
19 Id. at 1102. 
20 See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982); Covington v. Southern Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
21 Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876. 
22 Covington, 816 F.2d at 323. 
23  See infra Part II(B)–(D); see also Hamburg, supra note 18, at 1085. 
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Some of the circuit courts adopted the viewpoint that prior salary history must be paired 
with an additional factor in order to qualify as a “factor other than sex” under the EPA.  In Irby v. 
Bittick,24 a female criminal investigator for a county sheriff’s department sued under the EPA when 
the department paid two new male additions to the team substantially more than she was paid.25  
The defendants argued that the reliance on the prior salaries of the male employees in setting their 
current salaries qualified as a legitimate factor other than sex.26  The district court, however, 
rejected the argument, holding that “[p]rior salary alone is not a legitimate ‘factor other than 
sex.’”27  The court explained that if prior salary history alone was the sole justification, the 
exception would swallow the rule, perpetuating gender pay inequality.28  On appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit recognized it consistently adhered to the view that under the EPA a pay disparity between 
the genders cannot be justified by prior salary history alone, and the court rejected reliance on prior 
salary history as a sole justification for the pay disparity.29  
While the court rejected a reliance on prior salary history by itself, it nonetheless held that 
a defendant can rely on prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” when the defendant also 
relied on something else, such as experience.30  The court found “there is no prohibition on utilizing 
prior pay as part of a mixed-motive.”31  Since the defendants relied both on prior salary history 
and the experience of the two new male employees, the Eleventh Circuit was satisfied that the 
defendants properly relied on a “factor other than sex” under the EPA to justify a pay disparity.32 
                                                     
24 44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 1995).  
25 Id. at 952–53. 
26 Id. at 955. 
27 Irby v. Bittick, 830 F. Supp. 632, 636 (M.D. Ga. 1993) 
28 Id. 
29 Irby, 44 F.3d at 955 (citing Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988)).  
30 Irby, 44 F.3d at 955. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 957. 
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In Angove v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc.,33 a fired male employee sued for, among other things, 
gender discrimination based on Williams Sonoma paying him less than a female employee in the 
same position.34  The plaintiff suggested that Williams Sonoma adhered to the “market factor” 
theory, whereby an employer justifies wage disparities based on the pay rates the two genders 
command in the marketplace.35  After rejecting this contention for lacking relevance, the court 
noted that the focus of the plaintiff’s argument was that Williams Sonoma matched the female 
employee’s prior salary.36  The Tenth Circuit then stated that considering a new employee’s prior 
salary history is not prohibited under section 206(d)(iv) of the EPA.37  Instead, it is the employer’s 
sole reliance on prior salary to justify a pay disparity that is precluded by the EPA; and when an 
employer bases a new employee’s salary on prior salary history and something else like 
qualifications and experience, the employer has successfully invoked the “factor other than sex” 
defense.38 The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, by requiring an additional factor other than prior salary 
history for a “factor other than sex” defense, impose the strictest, most scrutinizing view of this 
exception under the EPA. 
C. The Circuit Split: Prior Salary History, Case-by-Case, and Reasonableness 
Other circuit courts accept the use of prior salary history as the sole factor in a “factor other 
than sex” defense, unlike the above-mentioned cases,39 but still conduct a factual analysis on a 
case-by-case basis or inquire into the reasonableness of the reliance on prior salary history.  In 
Taylor v. White,40 when a female United States Army employee sued her employer because her 
                                                     
33 70 Fed. Appx. 500 (10th Cir. 2003). 
34 Id. at 504. 
35 Id. at 507. 
36 Id. at 508. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See supra Part II(B). 
40 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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male colleagues performing the same work received higher pay,41 she contended that an employer 
should be prohibited from relying on prior salary history or a salary retention policy to avoid 
liability under the EPA because relying on said factors allows the perpetuation of wage 
inequalities.42  The Eight Circuit, however, stated that nothing on the face of the EPA indicates 
any limitations to the catch-all “factor other than sex” defense, and the legislative history bolsters 
the view of a broad interpretation of this catch-all exception.43  While the court acknowledged that 
even a salary retention policy could be used to perpetuate unequal wages based on past 
discrimination, these concerns do not dictate adopting a per se rule finding all salary retention 
practices inherently discriminatory.44  
Rather than adopt a per se rule, the court instead recognized “the need to carefully examine 
the record in cases where prior salary or salary retention policies are asserted as defenses to claims 
of unequal pay.”45 The Eighth Circuit thought a case-by-case analysis into the reliance on prior 
salary history or salary retention policies with a discerning eye on the alleged gender-based 
practices would protect certain freedoms in business as Congress intended with the “factor other 
than sex” defense.46  What the Eighth Circuit did not endorse, however, is conducting a 
reasonableness inquiry into the employer’s actions or limiting the application of a salary retention 
policy to exigent circumstances only, as it would unnecessarily narrow the intent of the “factor 
other than sex” defense.47   
                                                     
41 Id. at 714. 
42 Id. at 717. 
43 Id. at 717–18. “[T]he catch-all provision is necessary due to the impossibility of predicting and listing each and 
every exception.” Id. at 718. 
44 Id. at 718. 
45 Id. 
46 Taylor, 321 F.3d at 720. 
47 Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit took a more narrow view than the Eighth Circuit, but still broader than 
the Tenth or Eleventh Circuits, in the most recent instance of a circuit court ruling on a gender 
discrimination case under the EPA, where a female county public schools employee sued the 
county after discovering the county paid her less than her male colleagues.48  When the County 
moved for summary judgment, it acknowledged the pay disparity but based the discrepancy on a 
factor other than sex—prior salary history.49  The district court rejected this defense and denied 
summary judgment, concluding that reliance exclusively on prior salary history is not a satisfactory 
“factor other than sex” defense.50   
Relying on precedent, the Ninth Circuit held that there is no strict prohibition against using 
prior salary history under the EPA, but it does not automatically qualify as a “factor other than 
sex” for purposes of the affirmative defense.51  Rather, prior salary history alone could 
satisfactorily justify a pay disparity only when “the factor ‘effectuate[s] some business policy’ and 
that the employer ‘use[s] the factor reasonably in light of the employer’s stated purpose as well as 
its other practices.’”52  When the plaintiff argued that relying on prior salary history alone would 
perpetuate existing pay disparities and therefore undermine the intended goal EPA, the court 
indicated that, in deciding the very same issue in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., requiring the 
employer to show that using prior salary history effectuated some business policy and the factor 
was used reasonably would alleviate these concerns.53  While both the Ninth and the Eighth 
Circuits state that prior salary history alone satisfies the “factor other than sex” factor under the 
EPA, the Eighth Circuit’s case-by-case factual analysis and the Ninth Circuit’s “effectuated 
                                                     
48 Rizo v. Yovino, 854 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, reh’g granted, 869 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.) (en banc). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1165. 
52 Id. (quoting Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876–77 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
53 Rizo, 854 F.3d at 1166 (citing Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876–78). 
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business policy” nonetheless indicate these circuits will view reliance on prior salary history alone 
with some suspicion. 
D. The Circuit Split: Deference to the Defense 
One circuit court, in the broadest interpretation of the “factor other than sex” defense under 
the EPA, accepts prior salary history as a factor other than sex without any qualifications or 
limitations.54  A female employee for the Department of Human Services in Illinois sued under the 
EPA, putting forward two arguments: (1) prior salary history must include an acceptable business 
reason; and (2) the use of prior salary history discriminates because all pay systems inherently 
discriminate based on sex.55  The Seventh Circuit noted how four appellate courts accept prior 
salary history as a “factor other than sex,” but only if the employer had an acceptable business 
reason.56  In looking to the actual statute, however, the court found that nothing in section 206(d) 
allows a court to set standards on what qualifies as an acceptable business practice, and that “the 
statute asks whether the employer has a reason other than sex—not whether it has a ‘good’ 
reason.”57  As long as employers avoid forbidden reliance on criteria like race or sex, employers 
may set their own standards for determining pay.58  The Seventh Circuit’s rule for prior salary 
history as a “factor other than sex” is reduced down to a single sentence: “[T]he employer may act 
for any reason, good or bad, that is not one of the prohibited criteria such as race, sex, age, or 
religion.”59 
There is one caveat, however, to the Seventh Circuit’s rule.  The court acknowledged that 
in certain lines of employment wage patterns could be discriminatory, but the court also noted how 
                                                     
54 See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005). 
55 Id. at 468.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 468–69. 
59 Id. at 469. 
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this must be proved and not assumed.60  Where an employee has been discriminated against in a 
prior job in violation of the EPA, relying on those wages to determine a new salary would 
perpetuate said discrimination in violation of the EPA.61  Absent evidence that plaintiff’s prior job 
engaged in wage discrimination in violation of the EPA, defendants’ reliance on that prior wage 
history was proper, and the court held the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.62  The 
Seventh Circuit, unlike all of the cases mentioned above, grants the most deference to an 
employer’s use of prior salary history as a “factor other than sex.” 
III. The Laws from Varying Cities and States 
Given the varying approaches taken by the Federal Circuits regarding prior salary history 
as a “factor other than sex” under the EPA in conjunction with the fact that all circuits accept prior 
salary history as a factor to some degree,63 cities and states across the country have simplified the 
analysis: by removing prior salary history as a factor altogether. 
A. The Massachusetts Law 
The Massachusetts law is intended to close the wage gap between the genders, with a focus 
on the phenomenon that lower wages and salaries of women follow them throughout their 
careers.64  The Governor signed the bill into law by on August 1, 2016, and it is expected to take 
effect July 2018.65  It also bears mentioning that this new Massachusetts law includes a codification 
of section 206(d) of the FLSA as amended by the EPA, but noticeably absent in the enumerated 
exceptions is the broad “factor other than sex” language of the EPA.66   
                                                     
60 Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 470. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See supra Part II. 
64 Stacy Cowley, Illegal in Massachusetts: Asking Your Salary in a Job Interview, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/business/dealbook/wage-gap-massachusetts-law-salary-history.html. 
65 Id. 
66 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(b) (2016) with Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 and 29 U.S.C. § 
206(d)(1). 
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As an initial matter, the law prohibits an employer from seeking an applicant’s prior salary 
history from the applicant’s current or former employer.67  Once the employer has extended an 
employment offer, including compensation, to the applicant, however, said applicant can give 
written authorization to the employer to confirm prior salary history with prior employers.68  the 
Massachusetts law makes it unlawful for an employer to prohibit an employee from discussing 
either the employee’s own, or another employee’s, wages as a condition of employment.69  The 
employer also may not screen applicants by setting a minimum or maximum criteria that the 
applicant’s prior salary or compensation history must satisfy; nor may the employer condition 
being granted an interview or continued consideration for an offer of employment on the 
applicant’s disclosure of prior salary history.70  Lastly, the law forbids an employer from firing or 
otherwise retaliating against an employee because the employee: (1) resisted any action by the 
employer prohibited under this new law; (2) already did or is about to complain or institute a 
proceeding against the employee for violating any of the above-mentioned prohibitions; (3) 
testified or is about to testify or otherwise assist an investigation into violations of the law; or (4) 
revealed the employee’s own salary information or asked about another employee’s salary.71 
The Massachusetts law does grant a degree of reprieve with a safe harbor provision, 
however, for any employer charged with gender-based wage discrimination.72  It appears, 
however, that this safe harbor does not apply where the employer violates the prohibitions on 
seeking prior salary history.73  Provided the employer demonstrates that within the last three years 
the employer had performed a pay practice self-evaluation and has made reasonable progress 
                                                     
67 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(c)(3) (2016). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. § 105A(c)(1). 
70 Id. § 105A(c)(2). 
71 Id. § 105A(c)(4). 
72 Id. § 105A(d). 
73 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(d) (2016). 
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towards eliminating gender-based pay differentials, the employer has an affirmative defense.74  
The employer can design this self-evaluation, but the evaluation must be reasonable in detail and 
scope relative to the employer’s size or consistent with attorney general’s standard templates or 
forms.75  It is important to note that this safe harbor provision does not apply to an alleged violation 
of Massachusetts’s general gender-based wage discrimination law if the alleged violation occurred 
prior to the completion of the self-evaluation or six months thereafter.76  Simplified, 
Massachusetts’s law prohibits employers from conditioning employment on an applicant’s 
disclosure of prior salary history, seeking such salary history information without the consent of 
the applicant or prior to offering an employment opportunity with compensation, or retaliating 
against any employee or applicant that opposes such illegal practices.77 
B. The Philadelphia Law 
Philadelphia enacted its own prohibition against employers requiring applicants to disclose 
prior salary history, signed into law by the mayor on January 23, 2017, intended to be effective 
120 says later on May 23, 2017.78  In its findings, the Philadelphia City Council stated: (1) that the 
gender wage gap still exists in the United States; (2) that this gap has narrowed only by less than 
half a penny per year since 1963 when the EPA was passed; (3) basing a worker’s current wages 
or salary on prior salary history only perpetuates the gender wage disparity; and (4) salary offers 
should not be based on prior salary history.79 
In order to combat the above-mentioned issues, the Philadelphia law makes it unlawful for 
an employer to: (1) inquire into an applicant’s salary history; (2) require the applicant to disclose 
                                                     
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. § 105A(c)(1)–(4). 
78 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1131 (2017). 
79 Id. § 9-1131(1). 
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prior salary history; (3) condition employment or consideration for an interview or employment 
on the applicant disclosing such information; or (4) retaliate against an applicant for refusing to 
comply with or opposing such salary history inquiries.80  These prohibitions mirror those of the 
Massachusetts law described above.81  Unlike Massachusetts, however, Philadelphia imposes an 
additional restriction that states an employer cannot rely on salary history at any stage in the 
employment process, such as in negotiating or drafting a contract.82  The employer may rely on 
such information provided that the applicant “knowingly and willing disclosed his or her wage 
history to the employer.”83  None of these provisions apply to employers following state, federal 
or local law specifically permitting disclosure or verification of wage history for employment 
purposes, however.84  Absent from the Philadelphia law is a safe harbor provision as found in the 
Massachusetts law,85 and the Philadelphia statute does not include a provision permitting an 
employer to seek the applicant’s prior salary history after an offer of employment has been 
negotiated and extended to the applicant like in Massachusetts and Delaware.86 
The Philadelphia law imposes the same general prohibitions on an employer requiring an 
applicant to disclose prior salary history or conditioning consideration for employment on such 
disclosure, seeking such information from current or prior employers, and prohibiting retaliation 
against applicants who resist.87  Philadelphia goes further though, prohibiting an employer from 
relying on prior salary history unless the applicant reveals such information knowingly and 
willingly.88 
                                                     
80 Id. § 9-1131(2)(a)(i). 
81 See supra Part III(A). 
82 PHILAELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii) (2017). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. § 9-1131(2)(b). 
85 Compare PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1131 (2017) with G. L. c. 149, § 105A(d). 
86 Compare PHILADELPHIA, PA. CODE § 9-1131 (2017) with supra Part III(A) and infra Part III(D). 
87 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 9-1131(2)(a)(i)–(ii) (2017). 
88 Id. § 9-1131(2)(a)(ii). 
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C. The New York City Law 
New York City enacted its prohibition against salary history inquiries when the mayor 
signed it on May 4, 2017, with the effective date being October 31, 2017.89  The law makes it 
unlawful for an employer to “inquire about the salary history of an applicant for employment.”90  
“Inquire” means any type of question or statement to the applicant, the applicant’s current or prior 
employer, or a current or former agent or employee of such employer in any method for the 
applicant’s salary history.91  The inquiry definition also extends to searching publicly available 
records for such information.92 
Similar to Philadelphia, New York City also prohibits an employer from relying on prior 
salary history for determining salary, benefits or other compensation to offer to an applicant at any 
stage of the hiring process.93  If an applicant, without prompting, voluntarily discloses prior salary 
history to an employer, its employee or agent, or an employment agent, the prospective employer 
is free to rely on such information.94  Furthermore, an employer may discuss with an applicant the 
applicant’s expectations as to salary, benefits, and other compensation, provided there is no inquiry 
into prior salary history.95 
Additionally, like Philadelphia, the law does not apply where federal, state, or local law 
requires disclosure of such salary history.96  The New York City law, however, also exempts 
internal transfers and promotions and public employee positions where salary is guided by 
                                                     
89 Brie Kluytenaar, Update on New York City Legislation Limiting Salary History Inquiries, THE NAT’L L. REV. (May 
10, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/update-new-york-city-legislation-limiting-salary-history-inquiries.  
90 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25)(b)(1) (2017). 
91 Id. § 8-107(25)(a). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. § 8-107(25)(b)(2). 
94 Id. § 8-107(25)(d). 
95 Id. § 8-107(25)(c). 
96 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25)(e)(1) (2017). 
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collective bargaining procedures.97  Lastly, where an employer seeks to verify non-salary related 
information or conduct a background check and discovers salary-related information, the employer 
has not violated the law, but still may not rely on such information in determining an applicant’s 
offered salary.98   
New York City’s prohibition against salary history inquiries generally mirrors that of 
Philadelphia on what employer actions are prohibited, but also seems to provide more protections 
for employers, mainly in allowing discussions about “salary expectations”99 and shielding the 
employer for accidental salary history discoveries.100 
D. The Delaware Law 
When signing the salary history ban into law, Delaware Governor John Carney was quoted 
as saying: “‘All Delawareans should expect to be compensated equally for performing the same 
work.  This new law will help guarantee that across out state, and address a persistent wage gap 
between men and women.’”101  The law went into effect December 14, 2017.102  Like 
Massachusetts,103 Delaware prohibits an employer or an employer’s agent from screening 
applicants based on prior salary history, including requiring prior salary to satisfy either a 
minimum or maximum criteria.104  The employer also may not “[s]eek the compensation history 
of an applicant from the applicant or a current or former employer.”105 Similar to New York 
                                                     
97 Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(2), (4). “Collective bargaining” is defined as “[n]egotiations between an employer and the 
representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, 
and fringe benefits.” Collective Bargaining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Pocket ed. 2016).  
98 Id. § 8-107(25)(e)(3). 
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City,106 however, an employer may still discuss and negotiate expected compensation with the 
applicant, provided that there is no request or requirement for the applicant’s compensation 
history.107  Furthermore, similar to Massachusetts,108 an employer can seek an applicant’s salary 
history after an employment offer that includes compensation has been extended to the applicant, 
but differing from Massachusetts, this offer must also be accepted.109  This inquiry is solely for 
confirming the applicant’s prior salary history.110 
It is important to note that the Delaware law is certainly the barest, least descriptive of the 
laws enacting prohibitions on salary history inquiries described in this note.111  This could cause 
problems for employers, uncertain of what exactly is prohibited and what is allowed. Regardless, 
the Delaware law does what every other law described in this Comment does: prohibits employers 
from inquiring into the salary history of an applicant while granting an employer flexibility to 
make a competitive offer to that applicant.112 
E. The Oregon Law 
Oregon’s ban on seeking prior salary history goes into effect October 2017; however, the 
law does not permit civil actions against employers who violate this law until January 2024.113  
Oregon, in its laws prohibiting salary history inquiries, also includes a codification of section 
206(d)(1) of the FLSA.114  Oregon’s codification includes a number of exceptions justifying pay 
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disparities between employees of different genders, but as seen in Massachusetts, the catch-all 
“factor other than sex” language has been removed.115  The absence of this catch-all language is 
telling—had Massachusetts or Oregon desired the “factor other than sex” language, it would have 
been included. 
Turning to the salary history-specific enactments, Oregon has made it unlawful for an 
employer to “[s]creen job applicants based on current or past compensation.”116  While not 
explicitly stated, this condition certainly includes the minimum-maximum criteria element as 
already seen in Massachusetts and Delaware.117  The law also forbids an employer from using 
current or past compensation as a factor in determining the compensation offered to a prospective 
employee.118  This prohibition, however, does not apply to an employer when a current employee 
is considered for a transfer, move, or hire to a new position with that same employer.119  
Furthermore, under chapter 659A of the Oregon Revised Statute, an employer cannot seek an 
applicant’s prior salary history from the applicant or the applicant’s current or former employer.120  
Once the employer has extended an employment offer that includes the amount of compensation, 
an employer can request written authorization from the applicant to confirm his or her prior salary 
history.121  This provision is in line with what Massachusetts and Delaware require.122 
Oregon, like Massachusetts, also offers a safe harbor provision in its law alleviates an 
employer from liability under certain conditions; except unlike Massachusetts, this safe harbor 
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does appear to apply to violations of the prohibition against salary history inquiry.123  It does 
appear, however, that this safe harbor does not apply to direct violations of the salary history 
inquiry ban.124  The employer will be liable neither for compensatory nor punitive damages if, 
within three years, the employer conducted a good-faith equal-pay analysis reasonable in detail 
and scope according to the size of the employer and related to the protected class in the suit;125 the 
wage disparity must also have been eliminated for the specific plaintiff and the employer must 
have taken reasonable and substantial steps to eliminate the wage disparity for the protected class 
overall.126 
Oregon is ultimately seeking to prohibit employers from screening applicants based on 
prior salary and using prior salary in determining how much to offer an applicant,127 as well as 
seeking this information from the applicant or the applicant’s current or former employer.128  But 
the employer also has a degree of leeway; an employer is allowed to confirm prior salary after 
extending a job offer which includes compensation129 and the employer is protected by a safe 
harbor provision.130 
F. The San Francisco Law 
In almost identical language to the Philadelphia law, the San Francisco City Council found 
that: (1) women in San Francisco suffer from a gender wage gap; (2) the gender wage gap has 
narrowed less than half a penny per year since the 1963 enactment of the EPA; (3) seeking prior 
salary history contributes to the wage gap by perpetuating wage inequalities; (4) women are put at 
                                                     
123 Compare H.B. 2005, 79th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 12 (2017) with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(d). 
124 See H.B. 2005, 79th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 12 (Or. 2017) 
125 Id. § 12(1)(a)(A)–(B). 
126 Id. § 12(b) (Or. 2017). 
127 OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220(1)(c)–(d). 
128 OR. REV. STAT. § 659A; H.B. 2005, 79th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 4 (Or. 2017). 
129 OR. REV. STAT. § 659A; H.B. 2005, 79th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 4 (Or. 2017). 
130 H.B. 2005, 79th Legis. Assemb, Reg. Sess., § 12 (Or. 2017). 
 20 
a disadvantage in negotiating salary when required to disclose prior salary history; (5) prior salary 
history is unlikely to not be a factor in negotiating or setting a salary offer; (6) the new law will 
ensure that a woman’s prior wage will not weigh down her earnings throughout her career; and (7) 
the new law will ensure employees and employers negotiate salaries based on qualifications rather 
than prior salary history.131 
Turning to the law itself, an employer is prohibited from inquiring into an applicant’s prior 
salary history,132 with “inquire” meaning any direct or indirect form of communication in any type 
of means to gather this information from the applicant.133  Further, an employer cannot consider 
an applicant’s prior salary history in determining what salary to offer, regardless of whether the 
applicant discloses the prior salary history voluntarily.134  This is a sharp deviation from the 
exceptions included in both the Philadelphia and New York City laws.135  Also, San Francisco, as 
displayed in previously discussed laws, prohibits an employer from refusing to hire or in any other 
way retaliating against an applicant for refusing to disclose prior salary history.136 
In another unique feature of the law, San Francisco also imposes liability on current and 
former employers, as a current or former employer cannot release the salary history of a current or 
former employee to said employee’s current or prospective employer without written authorization 
from the employee.137  Only San Francisco imposes such a restriction on current or previous 
employers.138  Lastly, an applicant can voluntarily disclose his or her prior salary history after an 
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employer makes an initial salary offer to negotiate a different salary.139  Only then may an 
employer use such a disclosure, but strictly as it relates to making a counter-offer.140  While San 
Francisco imposes many of the provisions already enacted by other cities and states, it is certainly 
the strictest, most pro-employee of the laws in light of the provision prohibiting an employer from 
considering prior salary history after an applicant makes a voluntary disclosure and the provision 
imposing liability on an employer revealing the information instead of just on the employer 
seeking the information. 
G. The California Law 
A bill, intending to narrow the gender wage gap by prohibiting employers from asking 
about prior salary history was introduced in California.141  Whether it would be signed into law 
was unclear, however, as the Governor of California, Jerry Brown, had vetoed a bill implementing 
the same laws two years earlier after being pressured by business groups.142  At the time, the 
governor was quoted as saying that the law prevented employers “‘from obtaining relevant 
information with little evidence that this would assure more equitable wages.’”143  The measure in 
2015, however, had no G.O.P. support and received not one G.O.P. vote, whereas the more recent 
bill was co-authored by two Republicans and the bill garnered ten G.O.P. votes.144  The bill did 
have opposition from powerful business groups as the Chamber of Commerce has gathered 
together an extensive coalition of detractors.145 
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The Governor signed the bill into law on October 12, 2017.146  An employer is now 
prohibited from relying on an applicant’s salary history as a factor for deciding whether to offer 
the applicant a job or how much to pay.147  The employer also may not seek such salary history 
information, whether it be oral or in writing, in person or through an agent, of an applicant.148  An 
applicant may voluntarily disclose his or her salary history information, and once an applicant does 
so, an employer is free to consider and rely on that information for determining an applicant’s 
offered salary.149  These prohibitions will not apply to any salary history information that is 
disclosable according to state or federal law,150 but are enforceable against “all employers, 
including state and local government employers and the Legislature.151  The bill went into effect 
on January 1, 2018.152 
IV. The Backlash, Implications, and Outlook in the Wake of these Laws 
A. The Legal Backlash 
These laws have faced backlash, however, including the Philadelphia ordinance that is now 
being challenged in court; the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia153 has brought suit 
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to strike down the ordinance.154  Experts believe this suit “may set the tone for future litigation 
over pay-history laws elsewhere.”155 
In its complaint, the Chamber stated that rather than achieve gender wage equality, the law 
“will chill the protected speech of employers and immeasurably complicate their task of making 
informed hiring decisions.”156  The Chamber, in its main argument, asserted that the ordinance 
violates employers’ First Amendment rights to free speech because it is both over- and under-
inclusive,157 and that the ordinance violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause.158  As to the First Amendment, the Chamber alleges that 
the ordinance imposes both content-based and speaker-based restrictions on employers’ speech 
because employers, and only employers, are prohibited from asking about prior salary history.159  
Also, prohibiting employers from seeking such information is a content-based restriction on 
employers’ speech, which can only withstand strict scrutiny when the restriction serves a 
compelling state interest.160  The Chamber alleges the law serves no compelling interest because 
while Philadelphia has a compelling interest in eliminating pay disparities based on gender 
discrimination, that interest does not extend to wage differences based on factors such as skill or 
training, which the Chamber believes the new law covers.161  The complaint further alleges that 
the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause because the ordinance is impermissibly vague by 
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failing to define key terms;162 and it violates the Commerce Clause because the law extends to any 
employer that either employs at least one employee in Philadelphia or transacts business in 
Philadelphia, even if that employer is in another state.163  Based on these allegations, the Chamber 
has requested preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent Philadelphia from enforcing the 
ordinance.164 
After receiving the Chamber’s complaint, on April 19, 2017, the judge stayed the effective 
date of the ordinance pending the outcome of the Chamber’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction.165  In order to avoid confusion, the city agreed to the stay for employers and employees 
as the legal process moves forward.166  On May 30, 2017, however, Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg, 
presiding over this litigation, found that the Chamber of Commerce failed to demonstrate with 
specific facts that one or more of its members will be directly affected by Philadelphia’s ordinance 
so as to establish standing.167  Without such facts, the court cannot determine whether any of the 
individual members would have standing to bring suit; since the Chamber could not show that at 
least one of its members would have standing to sue, the Chamber itself does not have standing to 
sue, and the judge granted the City’s motion to dismiss.168  The matter was dismissed, however, 
without prejudice, and the Chamber was granted leave to amend its complaint within fourteen days 
of the order.169   
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On June 13, 2017, the Chamber filed its amended complaint, alleging the same 
constitutional violations as before; however, this time the amended complaint included an 
extensive outline of the ways that the ordinance will harm certain particular enumerated members 
as exemplars for the group as a whole.170  Philadelphia did not file a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint, so this lawsuit will be decided on the merits.171  Being a case of first impression, the 
result of this lawsuit could resonate throughout the country with other state and city legislatures 
enacting, or considering enacting, other similar salary history bans.172 
B. The Legislative Pushback 
a. The Illinois Veto 
Rather than enact legislation similar to the ones seen above,173 the Governor of Illinois 
vetoed a bill that would prohibit employers from asking about an applicant’s prior salary history.174  
The Governor stated his support for eliminating the gender wage gap, but suggested a bill more 
closely modeled after the Massachusetts law that would provide employers with more leeway.175  
The Illinois bill did not include the caveat, as found in the Massachusetts bill, that an employer 
could seek prior salary history after offering a candidate the job with a salary.176  There was 
disappointment in the Governor vetoing the bill, but the indication that the Governor recognizes 
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the existence of a gender wage gap and that a prohibition on asking about prior salary history could 
eliminate it is encouraging to supporters of the bill.177 
Instead of re-working the bill, those in favor of the bill planned to override the Governor’s 
veto legislatively in the November veto session.178  The initial bill passed in the House by a vote 
of 91-24 and passed in the Senate by a vote of 35-18 (with one member voting present).179  The 
override requires seventy-one votes in the House and thirty-six votes in the Senate, and a 
Republican representative expressed his optimistic belief that the override effort will be successful 
due to the bill’s strong bi-partisan support.180  On November 9, 2017, however, when the Illinois 
Senate attempted to override Governor Rauner’s veto, it failed to do so.181  The Illinois House had 
successfully overridden the veto 80-33, but the Illinois Senate vote, needing three-fifths of 
members (thirty-six members) to vote in favor of the override, only garnered twenty-nine “yeas,” 
seventeen “nays,” and one “present.”182  At this point, it is unclear what will happen in Illinois 
regarding a prohibition against salary history inquiries, but the attempt to enact such legislation 
signals the growing desire for such prohibitions. 
b. The New Jersey Veto 
In the Summer of 2017, the New Jersey legislature put forward an amendment to the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) that would have enacted similar salary history bans 
as seen above.183  The law would have prohibited employers from: (1) inquiring about an 
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applicant’s compensation and benefit history at any point during the hiring process; (2) screening 
a candidate based on his or her prior salary or benefits history; (3) using that prior salary history 
to make pay determinations; and (4) retaliating against an employee who shared terms and 
conditions of employment, like compensation, with other current or former employees.184  A 
candidate could volunteer prior salary history, at which point the employer could verify the 
information, provided that there was no employer coercion and the candidate gave written 
authorization for the inquiry.185  
Chris Christie, then-Governor of New Jersey, vetoed this bill on July 25, 2017 because he 
felt that the law would punish inquiries made without discriminatory intent or impact in 
contradiction to the NJLAD.186  Governor Christie indicated receptiveness to consideration of a 
bill that could protect against wage discrimination without being hostile to business.187  There was 
an expectation that once Governor Christie was out of office in early 2018, the legislature would 
again introduce the same or a similar bill.188  Phil Murphy, a Democrat, defeated Republican Kim 
Guadagno in the New Jersey gubernatorial election and took office January 16, 2018.189  Governor 
Murphy has already pledged to sign pay equity legislation into law, nearly assuring that New Jersey 
will have new pay equity laws, although the specifics of such legislation is not known.190 
C. What’s on the Horizon? 
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New York City Public Advocate Letitia James expects a legal challenge from business 
groups like what occurred in Philadelphia.191  James expects likely litigation because of the 
pushback the New York City law received from trade associations like the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.192  She was quoted as saying, “‘I suspect that someone will probably file a lawsuit,’” 
adding, “‘Whenever you make any change and move the needle forward, it’s inevitable that some 
individuals will push back.’”193  As of writing, there is no indication that any suit has been filed 
challenging the New York City law.194 
D. A National Ban on Prior Salary History Inquiries 
On May 11, 2017, Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Democrat from the District 
of Columbia, introduced a bill to amend the FLSA to prohibit certain practices by employers 
regarding prior salary history, cited as the “Pay Equity for All Act of 2017.”195  This Act would 
introduce a new section, section 8, to the FLSA making it unlawful for an employer to: (1) screen 
prospective employees based on prior salary history in such ways as (a) requiring that prior salary 
meet a minimum or maximum criteria, (b) requesting or requiring prior salary history as a 
condition of being interviewed, or (c) conditioning continued consideration for an offer of 
employment on the disclosure of prior salary history;196 (2) seek an applicant’s prior salary history 
from any current or former employer of the applicant;197 and (3) fire or retaliate against a current 
or prospective employee for: (a) opposing any of the practices made unlawful above, (b) nearing 
the process of making a complaint against the employer for violations of this act, or (c) testifying 
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or is about to testify, assist, or participate in an investigation relating to the prohibited conduct.198  
Since being referred to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce on the same day as 
the bill was introduced, there has been no further action on the Pay Equity for All Act of 2017.199 
V. Achieving the EPA’s Goals and Changing the Courts’ Analysis 
In enacting these laws, either the laws themselves or the lawmakers signing them have 
hinted at one of the reasons for the enactment of such measures: the EPA has failed to accomplish 
what it set out to do.  The Philadelphia law acknowledges the dismal lack of narrowing in the 
gender wage gap since the passage of the EPA, and relying on prior salary history perpetuates 
wage inequalities.200  Bill de Blasio, Mayor of New York City, was quoted saying, “‘It is 
unacceptable that we’re still fighting for equal pay for equal work. The simple fact is that women 
and people of color are frequently paid less for the same work as their white, male counterparts.”201  
He followed with, “This Administration has taken bold steps to combat the forces of inequality 
that hold people back, and this bill builds upon the progress we have made to close the pay gap 
and ensure everyone is treated with the respect they deserve.”202  The Mayor of Delaware echoed 
a similar sentiment as Mayor Bill de Blasio when signing the Delaware law into legislation.203  As 
previously mentioned, noticeably absent from Oregon’s law outlining the bona fide reasons for a 
pay disparity is the vague language of “factor other than sex,” in addition to banning prior salary 
history.204  This suggests an awareness that employers have been utilizing the prior salary history 
and “factors other than sex” at large to perpetuate gender wage discrimination  The San Francisco 
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law stated the same findings as Philadelphia, hinting at a failure of the EPA and how reliance on 
prior salary history perpetuates gender wage inequality, including findings related to Rizo 
regarding how relying solely on salary history would be in opposition to the goals of Congress in 
enacting the EPA.205  Governor Jerry Brown of California even described the “simple question” 
of prior salary as being a “barrier to equal pay.”206  Explicitly or implicitly, lawmakers are 
accelerating the goals of the EPA prohibitions against salary history inquiries, no longer 
acquiescing to the tortoise-like pace of historical progress. 
Furthermore, it is incredibly difficult to determine whether an employer’s reliance on prior 
salary history is genuine or a pretext for taking advantage of discriminatory wage practice, or even 
if the applicant’s prior salary was based on sexual discrimination.207  And although circuit courts 
acknowledge the potential for employers exploiting prior salary history as a “factor other than 
sex,” the circuit courts continue to uphold its use as an affirmative defense, albeit without any 
uniformity to its application.208  Another clear, albeit unspoken, goal of these state and municipal 
legislatures is to eliminate prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” in its entirety so as to 
remove it from a court’s consideration when hearing a sex-based wage discrimination claim.  
While a “factor other than sex” defense is still available, prior salary history will no longer serve 
as an easily identifiable card for employers to play in the states and cities where the laws have 
been enacted.   
Businesses will certainly lose one key factor used in the hiring process, making offering 
and negotiating a salary more difficult, especially to high-ranking executives.209  Proponents of the 
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law, however, recognize that this will lead to more hiring decisions based on merit.210  Businesses 
still have education, experience, recommendations, references, aptitude tests, etc. to determine if 
a candidate is a proper fit for the job.  And, most of these laws do not fully eliminate the ability of 
an employer from asking about prior salary history or negotiating once a candidate has voluntarily 
disclosed such salary history.211  Eliminating prior salary history as a “factor other than sex” greatly 
increases the chances of further closing the wage gap and protecting women from wage 
discrimination while leaving businesses no worse off than before. 
VI. Resolving the Circuit Split while the Legislatures Act 
Even while federal, state, and town legislatures push to enact their own versions of a salary 
history inquiry prohibition, those states and towns without such legislation will be bound to the 
analysis of the circuit court of the circuit in which they are located.  As such, the differing analyses 
should be evaluated and resolved.  The reasoning of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, that prior 
salary history alone cannot be the sole justification as a “factor other than sex,”212 is flawed because 
nothing in the EPA or FLSA suggests this standard.  The list of exceptions that the EPA added to 
the FLSA are separated with an “or” and in the “factor other than sex” language, “factor” is 
singular.213  This construction suggests that an employer need only show one of the enumerated 
exceptions, and within the catch-all provision, need only show one factor other than sex.  By 
insisting that employers show prior salary history and an additional factor, the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits are imposing a higher burden on employers facing EPA and FLSA wage-discrimination 
challenges. 
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Further, the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, that prior salary history is a valid “factor 
other than sex” unless there is a showing that the prior salary was the result of gender 
discrimination,214 while more reasonable, is too lenient.  This approach does not conduct an inquiry 
into the current employer’s potential invidious behavior but determining whether or not the prior 
employer engaged in gender-based wage discrimination is a daunting task for employees asserting 
a violation of the FLSA.  The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, affording employers more 
discretion than the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, affords employers too much discretion. 
This leaves the last approach taken by the circuit courts as the best approach when resolving 
a plaintiff’s gender-based wage discrimination claim—that taken by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.  
Those circuits conduct a reasonableness inquiry into the employer’s use of prior salary history as 
a factor other than sex or ask whether a reliance on prior salary history effectuates a business 
policy.215  This analysis is squarely in the middle of the two approaches mentioned above, 
imposing less of a burden than the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits do, but affording employers less 
discretion than the Seventh Circuit does.  The approach of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits keeps 
both parties’ interests in mind, suspicious of an employer’s reliance on prior salary history, but 
willing to accept the idea that an employer innocently uses prior salary history as a legitimate 
factor in determining an employee’s pay.  So, until prior salary history prohibitions are enacted 
throughout the country, district courts and circuit courts should adopt the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in evaluating claims arising under the FLSA involving prior salary history. 
VII.  Conclusion 
Congress enacted the EPA with the intention of eliminating gender-based wage 
discrimination.  In order to protect employers, however, this Act listed exceptions, one of which 
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is a “factor other than sex.”  Numerous circuit courts acknowledge that prior salary history is a 
“factor other than sex,” varying by how much weight the courts give to that factor alone, despite 
the recognition that prior salary history can be exploited and abused to continue gender-based wage 
discrimination.  Unsatisfied with the current pace of progress regarding equal pay, and unwilling 
to let this matter play out in the judiciary, multiple legislatures around the country have enacted 
legislations prohibiting inquiries into prior salary history.  By their own words, lawmakers 
appreciate that the EPA alone is not getting the job done and recognize inquiries into prior salary 
history stand as an obstacle to full pay equality for equal work.  This march of progress is moving 
rapidly and will not stop until prior salary history is eliminated as a “factor other than sex” in its 
entirety across the country.  As a result, employers will no longer be allowed to disguise gender-
based pay discrimination as an innocent reliance on prior salary history. 
